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Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age
of Legal Nostalgia*
Marc Galanter**
Men ever praise the olden time, and find fault with the present,
though often without reason. They are such partisans of the
past that they extol not only the times which they know only by
the accounts left of them by historians, but, having grown old,
they also laud all they remember to have seen in their youth.
Their opinion is generally erroneous in that respect ....
Niccolo Machiavelli (1532)1
Lawyers, of the generation that I know, are apt to think their
lot cast in evil days. How often we hear that the profession is
commercialized; that the lawyer of to day does not enjoy the
position and influence that belonged to the lawyer of seventyfive or a hundred years ago; that, instead of being an all-around
lawyer, one must now be a specialist; that the rules of law are
less definite, and the decisions of the courts less certain that
they used to be; and that the last thing a lawyer need know, in
order to success [sic] under present-day conditions, is the law.
Lloyd W. Bowers (1904)2
No one watching the contemporary furor over the litigation
explosion and lawsuits devouring America can fail to be impressed
by the power of folklore to overwhelm workaday organized social

* 0 1996 Marc Galanter.

Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Legal Studies, University
of Wisconsin Law School.
1. Niccolo Machiavelli, Disourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius (Christian E.
**

Detmold, trans.), in MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 271 (1940).

2. Lloyd W. Bowers, The Lawyer To-Day, 38 AM. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (1904). Bowers
(1859-1910) was general counsel of the Chicago & North Western Railway Co. and SolicitorGeneral of the United States from 1909 until his death.
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knowledge.3 Time and again, the protestations of bean-counters
and skeptics are vanquished by stories about perverse institutions
peopled by malingering plaintiffs, greedy lawyers, capricious jurors,
and arrogant judges, proving yet again that it is not what is so that
matters, but what people -

at least for the moment -

think is so.

Tenacious belief may not make it so, but can have powerful effects.
In this essay I address another cluster of folklore about the
legal system - one that belongs more to our professional discourse
than to the wider public debate, although it has its echoes there.
I propose to examine the prevalent notion that the legal profession
has fallen from an earlier condition of grace into an abject and
debased condition. Many believe that lawyers, courts, and the law
once displayed an excellence no longer in evidence. Contemporary
discourse about law practice is laced by a sense of lost virtue and
lost amenity and infused with nostalgia for the good old days.

In the literature decrying the litigation explosion, for example,
America's legal malaise is seen as part of a falling away from the
true America. This view mourns the loss of a time when society
was benignly self-regulating, law was clear, certain and reasonable,

judges applied it dutifully and eschewed activism, lawyers were
upright paragons of civic virtue, and litigation was rare.4 Fables of

3. On the complex of folkloric beliefs about America's "litigation explosion," see Marc
Galanter, Predatorsand Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633
(1994); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV.
U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
REV. 3 (1986); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM chs. 1-2 (1995).

These larger assertions about the civil justice system are embodied in oft-related
atrocity stories about outrageous claims and monstrous decisions. See Stephen Daniels, The
Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 269, 292-97 (1989); Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis:
Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11
STUD. L. POL'Y & SOCY 95, 104-08 (1991); Steven Brill & James Lyons, The Not-so-Simple
Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1, 1986, at 1; Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 39.
4. In Walter K. Olson's The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When America
Unleashed the Lawsuit (1991), there is recurrent reference to "the old legal system" - a
normal orderly world in which the law was clear, judges were restrained, lawyers were
upright, and litigation was rare. Id. at 3; see also id. at 142, 145, 155-56, 168, 216-19, 340;
PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
Huber's book is premised on the notion that "we are living in an altogether new legal
environment, created in little more than twenty years, and profoundly different from what
existed in this country and in England for six centuries before." Id. at 10. Huber makes
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decline range from the lament of a Supreme Court Justice about
the imagined debasement of the caseload of the federal courts since
his law school days5 to popular distress about litigiousness in a
rural county with little litigation.6

Of course, the lure of nostalgia is not peculiar to law. The
sense of painful loss and disaffection with the new pervades much
cultural criticism. Raymond Williams traced the centuries-long
series of laments about the demise of traditional English country
life that was "'dying out now."' 7 Reviewing a set of new books

about beaches, Jonathan Raban found the same pattern of the
receding Golden Age that Williams found in remembrance of
country life. An author under review, Raban observes:
Like so many other writers about the coast,... affects a tone
of routine threnody and his book takes the form of a lament for
yesteryear - for lost crafts and industries, lost places, lost
people. It's always the conceit of such writers that the golden
age of the beach existed within living memory and that its fall
from grace has happened as a result of very recent industrial,
social, or bureaucratic upheavals.8

references to the more rational and benign conditions that prevailed under "the old law."
E.g., id. at 21, 23, 71, 96, 97, 116-19, 186.
5. Antonin Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and
the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987). But see Marc Galanter, The Life
and Times of the Big Six; Or, the FederalCourts in the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
921, for the evidence of misperception associated with this view.
6. David Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and PersonalInjuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 551, 551-52 (1984). Engel studied a small
Illinois county in which concern about litigiousness was high, although there was relatively
little litigation. Id. at 551. Although contract actions were almost ten times as frequent as
personal injury cases, it was the latter that provoked concern because they controverted core
community values of self-sufficiency and stoic endurance. Id. at 574-75. Engel concluded
that denunciation of tort litigation was "significant mainly as a symbolic effort by members
of the traditional community to preserve a sense of meaning and coherence in the face of
social changes they found threatening and confusing." Id. at 580.
7. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 9, 11-12 (1973). As he
pursued the trail back to the time of the Magna Carta and the Norman Conquest, Williams
wondered whether
the timeless rhythm [lies] ... in a free Saxon world before what was later seen as
the Norman rape and yolk? In a Celtic world, before the Saxons came up the
rivers? In an Iberian world, before the Celts came, with their gilded barbarism?
Where indeed shall we go, before the escalator stops?
One answer, of course, is Eden ....
Id. at 11-12.
8. Jonathan Raban, On the Waterfront, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 14, 1994, at 39. In an

observation that might apply to many chroniclers of Golden Ages, Raban notes that the
author of the book in question "seems in this book to be a historian with little interest in
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Commenting on the discourse of educational reform, Hanna
Holborn Grey recently observed:
The language of educational criticism ...is most often that

of longing. The rhetoric of concern about higher education
stands as a surrogate for talking about a confusing and always
changing world, of sketching out the ideals of a better, more
coherent, and once-stable universe. Yearning for the idyllic way
things were when one went to college, the wish that the place
would never change, the fear that it has done so; all this
represents a common form of expressing distress and disillusion
with a threatening, uncertain, and mystifying world that now
challenges cherished beliefs and once-secure anchors, one that
threatens to repudiate the clarities and simplicities of a better
time....
The "golden ages" constructed in the service of educational critique and reform float somewhere uneasily in a timeless
stratosphere that is nonetheless asserted to have existed in a
nameless historical space.9
The decline of law from a noble profession infused with civic
virtue to commercialism has been a recurrent theme of professional
discourse. Distress about lost virtue has been a constant accompaniment of elite law practice at least since the formation of the large
firm a hundred years ago.1" Indeed, when the large law firm was
invented, just before the turn of the century, there was already a
sense that the profession had fallen from its former high estate and,
by too close an embrace of business, had become merely a branch
of business:
[The bar] has allowed itself to lose, in large measure, the lofty
independence, the genuine learning, the fine sense of professional dignity and honor ....[Flor the past thirty years it has

become increasingly contaminated with the spirit of commerce
which looks primarily to the financial value and recompense of
every undertaking.1

history, and his disregard for the past enables him to invent it at his convenience." Id.
9. Hanna Holborn Gray, The Leaning Tower of Academe, 49 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS
& Sci. 34, 35-36 (1996).
10. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 11, 36 (1991); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
11. The Commercializationof the Profession, AM. LAW., Mar. 1895, at 84.
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That very contemporary critique was published a hundred years
ago in the American Lawyer, not the intense monthly that since
1979 has chronicled and cheered on rapid change in the world of
large law firms, but a long-extinct legal newspaper of the same
name published in New York from 1893 to 1908.
A century later, the 1990s has seen a remarkable flowering of

lament about decline and celebration of the profession's virtuous
past. Within a few years we have seen the publication of Mary
Ann Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers, 2 Anthony Kronman's
The Lost Lawyer, 13 and Sol Linowitz's The Betrayed Profession"a

- to mention just three prominent contributions to the genre. 5
We are surely living in the literary Golden Age of nostalgia for the
Golden Age of lawyering. t6

Professor Glendon and Dean Kronman concur that the last
twenty-five years or so have witnessed a triple decline: in the
judiciary, in the legal academy, and in the practicing bar particularly the bar's elite large firm sector. It is the latter that I
wish to address. Dean Kronman's story is simple and straightforward: "For a hundred years the large corporate firm has been the
principal standard-bearer of the lawyer-statesman ideal in the

12. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).
13. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
14. SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION (1994).
15. These represent the crest of a swiftly flowing tide. See, e.g., Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 949 (1995) ("The
decline of professionalism ... in the law, has taken on epidemic proportions."); Arlin M.
Adams, The Legal Profession: A CriticalEvaluation, 93 DICK. L. REV. 643, 652 (1989) ("The
... most pervasive manifestation of the change in the legal climate is the decline of
professionalism and its replacement with commercialism."); Norman Bowie, The Law: From
a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741 (1988); Lincoln Caplan, The Lawyers' Race
to the Bottom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at A-29. For a dyspeptic version of the declension
theme, see PETER MEGARGEE BROWN, RASCALS:
THE SELLING OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1989). For the bar's "official" account of the danger of commercialization, see
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) [the "Stanley
Report"].
16. Dissent from the Golden Age view rarely appears in print. For two notable
examples from practitioners, see Milton V. Freeman, The Profession of Law is NOT on the
Decline, 96 DICK. L. REV. 149 (1992); John H. Pickering, The Profession'sBetter Than Ever,
EXPERIENCE, Summer 1995, at 22; cf. Richard Posner, Barflies, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 31,
1994, at 40, 41 ("The profession was not as wonderful in 1960 as Glendon makes out. Many
of the changes since then are improvements or inseparable from improvements."). For a
sanguine and eloquent early twentieth-century response to lost glory laments, see [railway
general counsel and Solicitor General of the U.S.] Bowers, supra note 2, at 2 (quoted in
epigraph).
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sphere of private practice" and the incubator of "a steady stream
of lawyer-statesmen. '"17 Until the "revolution" of the practice
environment of past twenty years 18 changed their institutional
character, the large corporate firm was the "primary carrier" of this
ideal. 9 But "today's large firm offers an environment much less
hospitable to the lawyer-statesman ideal."20 Now, few large firms
are committed to public service "except in the most begrudging and
mechanical way."'" So the lawyer who wishes to live a life
centered on the values of the vanishing lawyer-statesman ideal is
advised to avoid elite corporate practice in favor of "the generalpractice law firm in a small town or city outside the country's
largest metropolitan centers."22
Professor Glendon's favored period overlaps with Dean
Kronman's, but she explicitly rejects the golden character of much
of the period that Dean Kronman extols. The early decades of the
large law firm fail to qualify as markedly superior to the present:
[I]f one's benchmark for corporate firms is the palmy days at
the turn of the century when lawyers were using every tactic in
the book (and many that were not) to help clients bust unions,
consolidate monopolies, drive competitors out of business, and
obtain favorable treatment from judges and legislators, it would

be hard to demonstrate a marked ethical decline.23
She locates the profession's Golden Age in the forty-year period
from 1920 to 1960:24 when lawyers were "widely oriented ... to
a common set of ideals;, 25 bar leaders consistently affirmed
concepts of professionalism; associates who did good work were
ordinarily rewarded with partnerships; lawyers would subordinate

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 378.
KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 379.
GLENDON, supra note 12, at 57.

24. In fairness, she avoids the locution "Golden Age" although clearly identifying the
period of superior virtue and amenity as roughly 1920 to the early 1960s. Id. at 34-37. As
one who enjoys jousting with promoters of Golden Ages, I am deeply grateful for her
specificity and her eschewing of the wiggle room to be had by positing a Golden Age that
elastically expands and contracts.
25. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 35.
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considerations 26of economic gain to "firm solidarity or to ideals of
right conduct.,

Surely these fine features graced the profession then - but
also present were many of the nasty things that in her account have
become dominant since the 1960s. There was probably - and I
think she agrees with this - more corruption then.2 ' And elite
law practice was disfigured by systematic exclusionary practices a blemish she feels has been overcome and does not cancel out the
genuine professional felicity achieved in that period.28
Things have gone awry in the past generation. Since Professor
Glendon is fully aware that all was not wonderful in those earlier
times nor are they entirely nasty now,29 this is a judgment about
the central tendency of law practice - or at least elite law practice
-

in two periods of time.

Here we see the perils of the Golden Age style of argument.
Sorting out the mixed bags of evidence about Period A and Period
B, it is tempting to solve the tricky problem of detecting those
central tendencies by proceeding on the basis that nobility is of the
essence for Period A; the imperfections and abuses we find are
regrettable dross, but do not alter the essential character of
practice. For Period B, however, the imperfections and abuses
reveal the essential character and occasional flashes of the noble
and elevated are sports or vestiges of a better time.
Basically the Golden Age is an essentialist argument, wellsuited to produce vivid contrasts and to suppress continuities.
Typically, such an account emerges not from independent examination of the past but from the polemical thrust of a critique of the
present. Its presentation may involve a number of specific
techniques. One is the selective invocation of great exemplars,
comparing the giants that strode the earth in those days with the at
best ordinary creatures of today. Thus, Professor Glendon uses not
only John W Davis but Abraham Lincoln to characterize the
26. Id. at 37.
27. Cf. id. at 72.
28. Glendon minimizes the thrust of exclusion, for the legal establishment of her Golden
Age did not simply decline to accept Jews, women, and Blacks in their own firms, but
fostered and supported extended campaigns to keep the wrong sorts of people out of the
profession entirely. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA ch. 4 (1976).

29. Thus, she provides an interesting set of accounts of contemporary practitioners who
have experienced immense gratification exerting themselves for clients in unusual ways.
GLENDON, supra note 12, at 95-98.
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virtues of lawyers in the Golden Age and Oliver Wendell Holmes
to illustrate its intellectual honesty.30
As the invocation of Lincoln suggests, another common
accompaniment of Golden Ageism is temporal displacement. For
example, describing the origins of discovery Professor Glendon
notes: "But attorneys representing economically powerful clients
now regularly use these devices to outwait and outspend their
opponents as well as to obtain pertinent information."'"
She illustrates this with a well-known story about Cravath
partner Bruce Bromley:
The Diaghilev of discovery ... [who] once boasted to an

audience of Stanford law students, "I was born, I think, to be
a protractor. . . . I would take the simplest antitrust cases and
protract for the defense almost to infinity.... [One case] lasted
14 years. . .. We won that case, and, as you know, my firm's

meter was running all the time - every month for 14 years."32
Surely a sad commentary on the ethics of the corporate bar. But
what does it tell us about decline from the Golden Age? Professor
Glendon picks up the Bromley quote from a 1978 Time Magazine
article.3 But Bromley (1893-1980) gave the Stanford talk in
1958, 34 when he was 65. He is describing events over the course
of a career that pretty much spanned Professor Glendon's Golden
Age. Perhaps Bromley, who rose to be a leading light at the firm
that as much as any exemplified the Golden Age, was a deviant
case. But how can we tell what is typical and what is deviant?
At least some contemporaneous observers back in the Golden
Age had a very different take on the virtue of the corporate bar.
In 1934, Harlan Fiske Stone, hardly a romantic enemy of the
established order, deplored the commercialization and deprofessionalization of the big-firm lawyer in terms that resonate with
Professor Glendon's (and Dean Kronman's) assessment of
contemporary practice:

30. Id. at 86.
31. Id. at 56 (emphasis supplied).
32. Id.
33. Id. The source is cited on page 301. Coincidentally, in The Litigation Explosion,
anti-litigation publicist Walter Olson also relies on the Time Magazine source to project

Bromley's account of half-a-century ago as evidence of novel conditions in the recent past.
OLSON, supra note 4, at 231, 366.
34. Bruce Bromley, Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417 (1958).
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More and more the amount of his income is the measure of
success. More and more he must look for his rewards to the
material satisfactions derived from profits as from a successfully
conducted business, rather than to the intangible and indubitably more durable satisfactions which are to be found in a
professional service more consciously directed toward the
advancement of the public interest .

. .

. [I]t has made the

learned profession of an earlier day the obsequious servant of
business and tainted it with the morals and manners of the
marketplace in its most anti-social manifestations. 35
Another observer of the profession in those days was Karl
Llewellyn, Professor Glendon's (and my) teacher and the subject
of her moving tribute to him as a champion of the common law
and the tradition of lawyerly craftsmanship. In 1933, Llewellyn
published a wide-ranging survey of the world of law practice in
which appreciation of the skill and ingenuity of the corporate bar
is combined with condemnation of its narrow business perspective
and the "lopsided" development of the law resulting from the
concentration of the most talented in the service of corporations.
Most of [the bar's] best brains . . . [are] in the service of large

corporations. They are the ablest of legal technicians. I doubt
if the world has ever known abler. But their main work is in
essence the doing of business.
•.. [T]he practice of corporation law not only works for
business men toward business ends, but develops within itself a
business point of view .... 31
Corporation law practice becomes itself a business.
[Albove all [the senior lawyer] is, and he is valued as, a
business-getter. The measure of him is the business he can
summon from the vasty corporation deep. . . . He cashes in,

then, as an enterpriser, putting his own label on the work of
others.37

Their work, their interest, and their outlook drive them into
lack of social perspective. They rival both the technical

35. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1934).
36. Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes - With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
177, 177 (1933).
37. Id. at 177-78.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:3

proficiency and the insight into the country's legal needs of the
Great Brass Brain that calculates the tides. Where we need
vision, there is vacuum.38

Of course, Stone and Llewellyn are using these descriptions to
flog the lawyers of their day, as our contemporary critics are
flogging those of the present day. But the accounts of these
observers raise a series of difficult questions: Was the large
corporate firm ever the prime carrier of the ideal of public service?
Has there really been a decline in the profession's devotion to
public service? How much has the mix of business and service
motivations changed? 9 Has there been a change in the extent to
which corporate litigators play hardball? It is fair to say that once
we abandon the essentialist Golden Age/Fallen Age frame, we just
don't know.
One reason such comparisons are difficult is that information
about law practice in the Golden Age was much more restricted
than in the present period. In the late 1970s, there was a sudden
and dramatic expansion in the availability of information about law
practice.4 With the growth of a more intrusive and candid legal
journalism, more ample directories, and more penetrating scholarly
research, information about the earnings, fees, clients, internal
politics, and business strategies of law firms became accessible
beyond a narrow circle of insiders. Earlier there were occasional
flashes that momentarily illumined the Stygian darkness - like
Bruce Bromley's candid revelations - but on the whole lawyers
were shrouded by norms of reticence and confidentiality. Today,
the glare of publicity exposes lawyers' work and wiles. Whether
lawyers' conduct has worsened remains unknown, but what surely
has declined is the opportunity for lawyers to hide beneath the
wraps of confidentiality, free of any external scrutiny. So it is
difficult to distinguish how much has changed in what lawyers are
doing and how much in what Steve Brill is making us unable to
ignore.

38. Id. at 179.
39. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 12, at 67 (characterizing the elite bar of the Golden
Age as suffused with a "trader" rather than a "raider" mentality (in Jane Jacobs's
metaphorical usage)).
40. On the "new information order of the law," see GALANTER & PALAY, supra note
10, at 68-75.
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Another confounding factor is the change in scale of the legal
world.4 If we accept large firms as an admittedly rough surrogate
for elite "big time" lawyering, we see that during Professor
Glendon's Golden Age elite practice involved only a few thousand
lawyers;42 fifty years later over 100,000 lawyers were practicing in
firms larger than fifty lawyers.43 However one assesses the quality
of their contributions, it would be surprising if there were not many
more Warren Christophers and Lloyd Cutlers engaged in public
service today than there were Elihu Roots and Henry Stimsons
then. That a much higher proportion of lawyers (or elite lawyers)
were engaged in disinterested public service in the good old days
seems highly unlikely. A sense of professional obligation to
provide legal services pro bono publico is far more evident today
than it was during Professor Glendon's Golden Age. As one 1940

graduate, looking back on changes in the profession, observed:
"During my law school days I cannot remember ever hearing the

words 'pro bono' or any reference to a professional obligation to
give free public service.""
Suppose for the moment that we were to concede that the
style and satisfactions of law practice have deteriorated. Would it
make any difference to anyone other than lawyers themselves?
The subtitle of Professor Glendon's book, "How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society" advances a
strong claim that American society is much affected by "the crisis
of the legal profession." But here "legal profession" is used in the
wider sense, encompassing judges and academics, as well as the
practicing bar. The crisis in all three manifests itself as the

41. On the growth of the various dimensions of the legal world, see Marc Galanter, Law
Abounding: Legalisation Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1992).
42. Well on in Professor Glendon's Golden Age, Fortune estimated that "about 100 U.S.
law firms have a dozen or more partners each. For every partner there are usually three
hired lawyers." The U.S. Bar, FORTUNE, May 1949, at 90, 172 (The three-to-one associate
to partner ratio is almost surely an overstatement.). In 1957, as her Golden Age drew to a
close, there were some 38 firms in the United States with 50 or more lawyers. ERWIN 0.
SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 43 (1969).

In 1991, there were 749 firms with 51 or more lawyers. BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA
N. CARSON, AMERICAN BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT:

THE U.S.

LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s 16 (1994).
43. There were 105,236 lawyers in firms of 51 or more in 1991. CURRAN & CARSON,
supra note 42, at 25.
44. Pickering, supra note 16, at 30. The emergence and growth of structured pro bono
activity in law firms is described in the several contributions to Robert A. Katzmann's The
Law Firm and the Public Good (1995).
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ascendancy - or at least the sustained eruption - of legal
romanticism. "What is novel is the rise in visibility, power, and
prestige of lawyers, judges, and scholars who are in open revolt
against traditional conceptions of their roles."4 5 We have undergone an "extended orgy of legal hubris."4 6 "[I]nnovators and
iconoclasts with shallow roots in legal traditions and poor grounding in normal legal science" have arrogantly flouted ideals of evenhandedness in judging, and have engaged in shoddy advocacy
scholarship.4 7 The invocation of settled traditions and normal
legal science colors the past with a harmony and consensus that was
only part of the contemporary experience. In the very midst of her
Golden Age:
For elite corporate lawyers who saw the events of the
times as a nightmare come true, law professors and teachers
were the enemy ....Law teachers were portrayed by some of
the bar's leaders as "dangerous academic theorists" who
"refused allegiance" to the American Constitution and form of
government and who threatened "the safety and security of
constitutional government." . . . [E]lite law teachers were
conceived of as subversive "liberals" who harbored ideas
resembling those of Karl Marx and as "dangerous academic
theorists" who pretended "to sit in judgment not only upon
decisions of the Supreme Court but upon the relative merits of
the judges."48
Prominent among the "dangerous academic theorists" of that day
was Karl Llewellyn, who now deservedly serves as Professor
Glendon's scholarly ideal and her model of "appetite and energy
for creative problem solving."49
As I read Professor Glendon, the sins of the contemporary
practicing bar are relatively venial, only part of a larger "crumbling
of civil society" that has released "tides of opportunism."5
Practicing lawyers, it seems, are less perpetrators of the crisis than
victims of the arrogance of the disdainful knowledge classes.51

45. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 283.
46. Id. at 288.
47. Id. at 288, 290.
48.

RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW

DEAL 133 (1995).
49. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 194.
50. Id. at 100.
51. Cf id. at 283 ("self-appointed vanguard of an aspiring oligarchy").
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CENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM

The real villains that Professor Glendon is exercised about are
judges who are assertive, arrogant, and activist, rather than
restrained and even-handed, and academics who abandon disinterested inquiry for advocacy scholarship.
But of course the Golden Age itself is as much advocacy as it
is history. What does its enduring appeal tell us about our legal
culture? What does its current flowering tell us about the changes
our legal order is undergoing? Golden Age arguments conscript
the emotional power of the personal sense of loss that is part of
our life cycle. In the accounts of Dean Kronman and Professor
Glendon, as in a long series of earlier accounts, the time when
virtue prevailed is just over the receding horizon of personal
experience. The sense of decline mirrors the common personal
experience of a gap between aspirations and practice: in the flesh,
working life is experienced as more mundane, routine, businesslike, commercial, money-driven, client-dominated, and conflictladen than it is supposed to be. It is easy to believe that the way
it is supposed to be is the way that it used to be.
But if it were just a reflex of biography, we would expect legal
nostalgia to be uniformly distributed. In the course of interviewing
solicitors in large firms in London, where the world of law practice
has gone through equally dramatic structural changes in the past
twenty years, I have been struck by the entire absence there of the
expressions of loss and regret that are so common among observers
of the American legal scene. 2
Why are Americans more susceptible to Golden Age angst?
Perhaps it is because we have such exalted aspirations for law and
lawyers. We are all familiar with the oft-repeated observation of
Alexis de Tocqueville that "[i]t is at the bar or the bench that the
American aristocracy is found."53 Chroniclers of the Golden Age
lament the fall from aristocratic virtue. But admiration for the
public ideals that lie at the center of the aristocratic vision should
not blind us to the partial and flawed character of their earlier
institutional incarnation. Nor should appreciation of the attainments of the profession eclipse our awareness of the new tasks

52. I have no systematic evidence, but I have the impression that some sections of the
American legal world - women and minority lawyers, plaintiffs' lawyers, ADR practitioners,
law and economics types, feminist legal theorists, to mention just a few - are less susceptible
to the charms of the good old days.
53. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288 (1959), quoted in
GLENDON, supra note 12, at 280 (different translation).
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facing lawyers in a world increasingly dominated by large formal
organizations.54
Our growing social knowledge about law suggests a more
nuanced and ironic response. It is long past time to abandon the
essentialism that makes the past good and the present bad - or
vice versa. And it is important to enlarge our concern to consider
not only the satisfaction and fulfillment of lawyers but the way that
different professional arrangements effect the law and its users and
consumers. Once the latter come into the picture, we may have a
very different view of earlier arrangements and recent changes.
The flowering of the large law firm represented the development
of a new level of proficiency in providing legal services. But it also
marked the emergence of what John Heinz and Edward Laumann
call "the two hemispheres of the profession,"55 one consisting of
lawyers in small practices serving individuals, and the other of
lawyers in large firms providing more elaborate lawyering to large
organizations (corporations, unions, governments). 6 The increasing proficiency of lawyers fostered by the organization of large
firms has been accompanied by a spectacular increase in the
disparity in the availability and quality of legal services between
organizations and natural persons. In recent decades, the sections
of the bar that service individuals have shared in the gains in
proficiency. But as law has become more complex and technical,
using it has become prohibitively expensive for almost all natural
persons, especially when contending with organizations. The
professional achievement of lawyers will depend far less on
recapturing the imagined felicity of the good old days than on their
response to the challenge of providing remedies and protections to
individuals and publics in a world of large organizations.

54. Cf.James S. Coleman, The Rational Reconstruction of Society: 1992 Presidential
Address, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1992).
55. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND./AMERICAN BAR
FOUND., CHICAGO LAWYERS:

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319 (1982).

56. Cf.Marc Galanter, Mega-law and Mega-lawyeringin the Contemporary United States,
in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS:

Dingwall & P. Lewis eds., 1983).
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